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Abstract
Background: The global war on terrorism has prompted an increase in the deployment of security personnel from
multi-national forces on foreign lands, especially in places where known terrorist groups are based. The aim of this
study was to obtain U.S. military and security personnel’s perceptions of the possibility of encountering a human-borne
with bioagent (HBBA) terrorist at an entry control point (ECP).
Methods: This study was a mixed-method, cross-sectional, survey-based, time-limited study. A validated, five-option
Likert scale questionnaire with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.82 and 0.894 for Constructs 1 and 2 was distributed to over 113
respondents with combat experience.
Results: The results indicated that 92.3 % of the respondents thought it was possible for a terrorist to employ
a biological agent to cause terror; 61.5 % claimed it was either possible or very possible, and 26.9 % claimed
it was somewhat possible for a terrorist carrying a biological agent to successfully breach a combat Forward
Operating Bases (FOB) ECP undetected. 26.9 % of the respondents agreed that “ECP soldiers are knowledgeable about
bioagents (BA)”, only 15.4 % responded that ECP soldiers have effective devices for detecting a BA on a terrorist
at an ECP.
Conclusion: Despite some limitations, this pre-study tends to indicate that while many U.S. military or security
personnel acknowledge the possibility of an HBBA terrorist breach and the vulnerability of U.S. combat post ECPs
to a BA breach, the soldiers at the ECPs lack adequate knowledge or devices to effectively detect a BA on a
terrorist at an ECP.
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Background
Terrorism is defined in numerous ways by different
agencies, governments and individuals. The common de-
nominator among the various definitions is that terrorist
acts are meant to create public fear and generate publi-
city for the terrorist’s course. The global community has
not been spared from one particular terrorist act: the
2001 World Trade Center attack. This event ignited a
global shift in the way the world reacted that has led to
a global war on terrorism. The United States military, in
its duty to execute the nation’s security strategies, has
deployed service men and women into combat and thus
has dispersed widely throughout the world. According to
the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Base Structure
Report (BSR), as of 2010, there were 662 facilities main-
tained by the U.S. Military in 38 foreign countries, ex-
cluding those in Iraq and Afghanistan [1]. The exact
number of military personnel and the numbers of U.S.
military bases on foreign soil, especially combat bases, is
unknown to civil society. An electronic search reveals
numerous assumptions about the accurate size of the U.S.
military. An article by Daniel R. Cobb claimed that in
2009, the “Pentagon acknowledge maintaining 865 active
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U.S. military bases in 130 countries outside the U.S.”, not
including bases in Iraq or Afghanistan ([2], pp. 1–2).
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism (BT) simply means an act performed by a
terrorist that uses a microbiological agent (bioagent) as a
means to create fear and panic in a community. Ashford
et al. [3] defined BT as the “intentional use of microor-
ganisms or toxins derived from living organisms to cause
death or disease in humans, animals, or plants on which
we depend” [p. 515]. Microorganisms such as many of
those employed as bioweapons are ubiquitous; they are
widely found in nature, and many could be intentionally
genetically modified to increase their capability to inflict
severe damage or disease [4].
The use of a biological agent (BA), which can be a
microorganism or the product of a microorganism (such
as a toxin), in biological warfare is ancient, dating back
to the 4th or 6th centuries BC [5–7]. The advances deliv-
ery of BAs commenced in the 14th century, when cata-
pults were used to deploy the cadavers of people who
died of plagues (Yersinia pestis), such as during the siege
of Kaffa by the Tarta army in 1346 and by the Russians
against the Swedish city of Reval in 1710. During the
French and Indian Wars, Sir Jeffery Amherst was re-
ported to have sent the blankets and handkerchiefs of
smallpox-stricken dead soldiers to Native Americans
who were allied with the French troops. A similar tech-
nique was reportedly employed by Francisco Pizzarro in
his campaign against the natives of what is now Peru
during the 16th century [4, 5, 7].
The first known BT in the U.S. is reportedly the 1984
contamination of an Oregon salad bar contamination by
a “Bagwan Shree Rajneesh” religious cult group. In 1996,
a Shigella dysenteriae type2 agent was used to contamin-
ate muffins and donuts in Dallas, Texas. In Washington,
DC, and Los Angeles, anthrax hoaxes were reported in
1997 and 1998, respectively; an actual anthrax attack oc-
curred in the widely remembered 2001 October postal
contamination incident [7–9]. Tucker [10] reported that
of 415 incidents between 1960 and 1998 in the public
domain (incidents in the classified domain were ex-
cluded) that involved chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear material (CBRN), 151 were terrorist events; 33
of these involved the use of biological agents. Other bio-
terrorist events during this period, as reported by Tucker
[10] and Dudley [11], included the use of eight microbial
pathogens, including typhoid fever, diphtheria, dysentery
and meningitis, the Salmonella bacterium or Francisella
tularensis here in the homeland.
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S.
Homeland Security Department received documented re-
ports of anthrax spore exposure, including 11 inhalational
cases, 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax, and five deaths [9].
On March 2002 in Texas, the 12th cutaneous anthrax case
was reportedly detected and was linked to mail in a Texas
laboratory. In 2003, a total of nine ricin BA threats were
reported [9], and the ricin toxin was discovered in a South
Carolina postal facility in October 2003. On February 3,
2004, the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington,
DC, was reported to have discovered ricin in the office of
Senator Bill Frist. As recently as April 2013, letters that
tested positive for ricin were reportedly sent to Senator
Roger Wicker [12], and similar letters were reportedly sent
to United States President Barack Obama and then-mayor
of New York City, Michael Bloomberg [13].
Terrorist desire to obtain bioagents
Martin et al. [14] documented that the Al Qaeda group
“initiated a biological weapon program in Afghanistan
before the overthrow of the Taliban regime” [p. 14], and
the U.S. military uncovered two of the laboratories that
had commercially supplied microbiological bioagents in
2001. Additionally, in 2003, the U.S. forces operating in
the north of Iraq seized a camp linked to the terrorist
group and found equipment and instructions for ricin
extraction [14]. Other documents indicating the extreme
terrorist groups’ desires to acquire and utilize BAs, espe-
cially against U.S. interests, are reported in [8, 15, 16].
Exposure of soldiers to BA
While many studies have examined the possible exposure
of deployed soldiers to infectious agents [17–19], little is
known or available for public/academic review regarding
the effectiveness of the U.S. combat Forward Operating
Bases’ (FOBs’) protective protocols against terrorists with
a BA at the ECP (Entry Control Point) or about the per-
ception(s) of personnel about bioterrorism. This informa-
tion is significant, especially because most combat FOBs
are situated in countries with terrorist groups that are
hostile towards or are actively battling U.S. military forces.
It is hoped that this information will provide leadership
and management ideas for modifying security and
training policies to better prepare and educate military
personnel to deter, detect and degrade any bioterrorism
threat. Moreso, this information will provide insight
into the level of understanding or education and will
examine whether bioterrorism preparedness is adequate,
especially when most FOBs employ numerous local
foreign nations to work in these FOBs while they reside
outside the FOBs.
Statement of problem
During combat duties in Afghanistan, one of the authors
observed and detected more than one Afghan local na-
tional (LN) with certain infectious skin conditions working
in the DIFACs (dining facilities) of major FOBs, serving
food to soldiers inside the base. These LNs resided outside
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the FOB and gain entrance to the FOB daily, passing
through security parameters established by the DoD. There
are tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prevent
or mitigate person-borne improvised explosive devices
(PBIED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIED) and to respond to or recover from chemical, bio-
logical, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks on FOBs.
The authors are unaware of any study to date that has
examined the perceptions of current or former combat
or security personnel regarding the possibility of an
HBBA terrorist’s attempt to breach a combat base’s entry
control point or how much these personnel know about
bioterrorism and/or bioagents.
Method
This study was a mixed-method, cross-sectional, survey-
based, time-limited study. It employed the distribution
of a validated five-Likert-Scale-type questionnaire with
Cronbach’s alphas of 0.82 and 0.894 for Constructs 1
and 2 [20].
The respondents were military or security personnel
with Anti-Terrorism (AT) Tactics, Technique and Pro-
cedure (TTP) experience and the ability to complete a
questionnaire comprising approximately 42 questions or
three quarter of the questions.
Over 113 questionnaires were disseminated between
April and August of 2014 with letters of introduction
and consent forms. The questionnaires were distributed
through the points of contact (POCs) for installations,
military units, and military school coordinators, and in
some cases, the documents were sent directly to military
personnel who showed willingness to participant, most
of whom were deployed or returning from recent com-
bat deployment. The completed questionnaires were
returned via POCs who either mailed them in sealed
packages or emailed them in bulk, or they were indi-
vidually mailed back to researcher.
The data collected were analyzed using the Statistical
Product and Service Solution (SPSS) statistical software
(Base Grad Pack shrink wrap version 21.0) for both de-
scriptive and scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha analysis).
Ethical statement/approval
The New Jersey City University IRB approved this research
on 05/13/2014 as part of the corresponding authors’ DSc
dissertation. The respondents’ privacy was protected, and
no identifying personal information was collected.
Results and discussion
Only 26 questionnaires met the established criteria and
constituted the sample for this preliminary study. Many
of the excluded questionnaires were from respondents
who lacked personal AT or TTP/ ECP experience, while
others had more than 10 unanswered questions.
Limitations of results
During the dissemination of the survey tool (question-
naire) to the target population, we found that many in
military personnel and Customs and Border Control/Im-
migration Service agents were reluctant to participate or
to allow their subordinates to participate. This ultimately
affected the response rate, the number of respondents,
and eventually the sample size of this pre-test study. The
small sample size made it impossible for the researchers
to make a broad generalization or inference from the find-
ings of the study. However, it is important to emphasize
that the results tend to show that the ECPs of combat
FOBs are vulnerable to breach by a terrorist carrying bio-
logical agents. Additionally, these perceptions come from
people who have been recently deployed (for the most
part) and have ECP TTP experiences in a combat environ-
ment. Over 92 % of the respondents in this study whose
questionnaires were completed, returned and analyzed
were combat veterans with a minimum of two tours of
deployment, and with personal ECP TTP experience.
Descriptive data of the respondents
Slightly more than eighty percent (80.8 %) of respon-
dents whose questionnaire were selected and analyzed
identified the military as their profession; 15.4 % were
retired military, and 3.8 % were from the Department of
Homeland Security. In terms of the military service
branch, 80.0 % were in the U.S. Army, 12.0 % were in
the U.S. Air Force, 4.0 % were in the U.S. Navy, and
4.0 % were in the U.S. Marine Corps. Of this sample,
69.2 % were enlisted, 26.9 % were officers and 3.8 % were
civilians.
Combat experience of the respondents
More than ninety-two percent (92.3 %) of the respon-
dents had been deployed to combat zones. In terms of
the combat campaign in which they participated, many
had multiple deployments to more than just one cam-
paigns, with 75.0 % just returning from the Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign in Afghanistan,
16.7 % just returning from the Iraq war (Operation Iraqi
Freedom-OIF), and 8.3 % involved in the Operation
New Dawn (OND) campaign. All of the respondents
claimed to have had personal knowledge of or training
in anti-terrorism procedures.
Respondents’ perceptions of the possibility of a biological
agent being used as weapon for terrorism and BA TTP
training and deployment
In response to the questionnaire item asking whether
a human-borne with bioagent (HBBA) terrorist at-
tack was possible, 92.3 % of the respondents an-
swered “Yes”, it is possible for a terrorist to employ
a biological agent to cause terror. This high positive
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response may have occurred because the majority of the
respondents had been deployed to combat zones and had
had anti-terrorism training. However, less than 50.0 %
(43.3 %) of the respondents had undergone TTP drills
meant to prevent or detect bioagents at the ECPs (Fig. 1).
What is the possibility that a terrorist carrying a biological
agent will successfully breach a combat ECP undetected?
Slightly more than sixty-one percent (61.5 %) of the re-
spondents reported believing that it is possible or very
possible for a terrorist carrying a biological agent to suc-
cessfully breach a combat FOB ECP undetected (Fig. 2).
Respondents’ knowledge level regarding BA and possession
of BA-detecting device while on duty at an ECP
An analysis of ECP soldiers’ knowledge about bioagents
and whether they have devices that can effectively detect
traces of bioagents on a person indicated that 53.8 % of
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that soldiers
at the ECP are adequately knowledgeable about how or
what to look for in terms of bioagents (Fig. 3). In terms
of whether every soldier at the ECP has devices that can
effectively detect traces of a bioagent borne on a person,
50.0 % of respondents either strongly disagreed or dis-
agreed that soldiers at ECPs have such devices (Fig. 3).
The vulnerability of military personnel to microbial
agents during deployments have been documented in
many studies [19, 21–23]. Vento et al. [22] reported an
increase in the isolation of resistant organisms from the
wounds of injured combat service members; multidrug
resistant (MDR) Escherichia coli (E. coli) agents were
isolated from the wounds of soldiers deployed to
Afghanistan, which resulted in the dissemination of this
MDR E. coli strain from Afghanistan into the U.S.A.
The results of this pre-study tend to indicate that the
majority (61.5 %) of the respondents believed that the
time of this study and based on the TTPs, the ECPs of
U.S. combat post are vulnerable to a successful breach
by a terrorist with a bioagent. This finding is similar to a
previous study conducted in Lagos, Nigeria [24], where
64.3 % of security personnel at the airport’s port of entry
(POE) had similar thoughts. Additionally, that study
reported that 87 % of the security officers believed that
an HBBA attack was possible, similar to the 92.3 % of
respondents in this study who reported the same belief.
If PBIEDs and natural human carriers of pathogens
are possible, it is only plausible to infer that the possibil-
ity of humans intentionally incubating BAs with a sui-
cidal terrorist intention. Researchers call such carriers
“human-borne with bioagent” (HB-BA) suicide terrorists.
In the instance of a vulnerability of current global metal
or personal body search procedures (which are specific
to explosives), terrorists can also purposely transport a
BA in a culture medium in an innocuous potable con-
tainer (A culture is a medium [abiotic or biotic] for propa-
gating [growing] microorganisms).
The fact that at the time that this report was written,
there has been no reported BT breach of any U. S. for-
ward operating combat base is no indication that such
an attack could not occur; there is always a first time,
as in the case of the September 11, 2001 airplane at-
tacks. As noted in the introduction, BT incidences have
occurred in the U.S. in the past, and Hylton [25] docu-
ments a breach of White House security with a modi-
fied anthrax bacillus.
As in all past pandemic or endemic incidents, humans
have been involved in the transborder dissemination of
pathogens globally, via travel, and this method could be
Fig. 1 Respondents’ perceptions and their distribution
Fig. 2 Number of respondents (%) that believed in the possibility of a successful breach of the ECP with a BA
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exploited by terrorists. Galamas [8] referred to people
who carry infectious BAs on themselves purely for harm-
ful purposes “suicide bioterrorists, who are less bothered
about the need for bio-secure facilities” (p. 85) who “can
thus transport BAs under untraceable BTs as a dissemin-
ation mechanism that will provide greater advantage to Al
Qaeda’s operatives” [p. 85].
While acknowledging the limitations of this study, the
authors are unaware of any similar specific study of this
group of respondents focusing on combat post ECPs.
While the findings of this study are preliminary, they
tend to indicate a possibility of BA vulnerability at the
ECPs of combat bases and suggest that the majority of
soldiers stationed at ECPs lack adequate knowledge
about BAs or devices to detect or deter a possible terror-
ist with a BA at the ECP. How would officers of the
Customs and Border Protection department perceive
this issue, and how well educated are they regarding BAs
identification at the various nations’ POEs? These are
questions that can only be answered with another large,
extensive study including this group of security personnel,
who were not allowed to participate in the present study.
On September 30, 2014, the country reported its first
indexed case of human-imported Ebola virus in a passen-
ger flying in from Liberia who was already incubating the
virus as he passed undetected through a U.S. airport POE.
On that day, the nation was informed by Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) officials that the
country had confirmed its first Ebola case in Texas [26].
This case illustrates the feasibility of a BA passing through
an ECP, even in the homeland.
Conclusion
There is a need for more studies to determine best prac-
tices for ECP TTPs’ or POEs’ to improve bioagent detec-
tion, deterrence and response in this era of a global war
on terrorism, given the ease with which bioagents can be
acquired in public markets and the educational level and
abundance of individuals who are willing to commit sui-
cide for martyrdom. Despite its limitations, this pre-study
tends to indicate that while a large percentage of some
U.S. military and security personnel acknowledge the pos-
sibility of an HBBA terrorist attack and the vulnerability
of U.S. combat post ECPs to a BA breach, soldiers at ECPs
lack adequate knowledge or devices to effectively detect a
BA on a terrorist at an ECP.
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